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Summary 
The Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle program was performing a proof pressure test on an engineering 
development unit (EDU) of the Orion Crew Module Side Hatch (CMSH) assembly.  The purpose of the 
proof test was to demonstrate structural capability, with margin, at 1.5 times the maximum design 
pressure, before integrating the CMSH to the Orion Crew Module structural test article for subsequent 
pressure testing.  The pressure test was performed at lower pressures of 3 psig, 10 psig and 15.75 psig 
with no apparent abnormal behavior or leaking.  During pressurization to proof pressure of 23.32 psig, a 
loud ‘pop’ was heard at ~21.3 psig.  Upon review into the test cell, it was noted that the hatch had 
prematurely separated from the proof test fixture, thus immediately ending the test.  The proof 
pressure test was expected be a simple verification but has since evolved into a significant joint failure 
investigation from both Lockheed Martin and NASA. 
Background 
The Orion CMSH draws a significant amount of heritage from the Apollo Command Module Side Hatch.  
They share a similar trapezoidal shape, perimeter mechanical latches and twin double four-bar hinges.   
 
Figure 1:  Apollo Command Module Side Hatch – View Looking Out 
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Structure 
Although the Orion CMSH shares the same trapezoidal structural shape as Apollo, the Orion CMSH is 
larger in size and a flat metallic structure whereas the Apollo CMSH was a curved composite structure.  
The design driver for Orion’s departure of a curved shape was due to the severe Orion Crew Module 
cabin leak requirements.  The gasket chosen at the time to meet the severe requirements was a Gask-0® 
seal, which in turn required a uniform sealing surface with tight tolerances that a flat surface was 
deemed simpler and cheaper to manufacture.  As the Orion program evolved, cabin leak requirements 
relaxed such that the seal was later changed to a hollow silicone seal.  That change allowed a latch loads 
reduction which then trickled down into additional mechanical hardware seeing loads relief.  However, 
the structure was unable to be updated for optimization to the seal change due to engineering, material 
and manufacturing long lead times. 
Mechanisms 
The Orion CMSH shares a similar latching system as the Apollo CMSH.  Orion’s latches are larger in size, 
increase in quantity from 15 to 17 total, utilize fixed length linkages and employ higher precision rigging 
features on each latch.  The Orion CMSH utilizes a series of 17 four-bar linkage latches, linked together 
thru a series of linkages and bell cranks and driven from a single ratchet-style gearbox.  Rigging of the 
latches is performed at each latch base through an adjustable latch base mount that provides minute 
latch positional control to adjust latch location and latch preload.  The Apollo CMSH rigging was 
performed by adjusting the length of the linkages between latches through the rotation clocking of a 
single rod-end bearing. Adjustments were limited to ½ thread pitch.   
Each latch is designed as an over-center mechanism which, when driven past its toggle point, cause the 
latch to drive further over-center toward its individual hard stop.  In the design of Apollo and Orion’s 
CMSH, an internal pressure would apply an outward acting load on the CMSH.  This would in turn load 
up on the rollers on each latch and, as long as the latches are rigged at a point beyond the toggle point, 
would force the latches towards their respective hard stops.  All latches are driven by a single gearbox.  
The gearbox is designed to drive the latches open and closed and incorporates a latch restraint 
mechanism.  The latch restraint, when engaged, locks out any induced latch movement that would drive 
the latches to the unlatched position. 
 Figure 2:  Orion Crew Module Side Hatch – View Looking Out 
Testing 
The purpose of the EDU was to perform risk reduction testing in support of NASA’s Exploration Mission-
1.  Due to this test article being an EDU and experiencing an unexpected failure, the decision was made 
to perform additional testing to understand the cause of the anomaly and any influences or sensitivities 
to variables that were part of the anomaly.  A subsequent series of eight (8) tests were performed in 
varying configurations, with a substantial increase in instrumentation, to study effects of the following: 
 Latch restraint engagement vs. disengagement 
 Latch rigging (latch distance from hard stop) 
 Varying pressure to study non-linear effects 
 Initial latch preload setting 
In all of the tests where the gearbox latch restraint was disengaged, similar latch behavior occurred 
where the individual latches moved toward the toggle point.  This result ruled out rigging and latch 
preload as a driving variable to the proof pressure test anomaly.  In all of the tests where the gearbox 
latch restraint was engaged, individual latches moved toward their respective hard stops (away from 
their respective toggle point). 
Analysis 
The analysis performed up to the time of the test anomaly was not adequate to accurately model the 
complex interaction of the CMSH structure, mechanism and test fixture flexibility.  A considerable effort 
was initiated as a result of the test anomaly to understand the influences of the pressure load on the 
mechanism such that the hatch would instantaneously release. 
The following simple diagram depicts how the CMSH structure deforming from an internal pressure load 
caused movement of the latches: 
 
Figure 3:  Diagram of Latch Motion with Internal Pressure Load Applied 
Several approaches were made to address the analysis complexity: Finite Element Model (FEM) using 
MSC.NASTRAN and flexible body assessments use MSC.ADAMS.  The MSC.ADAMS model used Computer 
Aided Design (CAD) models of the Orion CMSH, to generate a complete 17 latch kinematic assembly.  
Flexibility was added to key members that reacted high loads through the use of 1-D springs where 
stiffness’s were analytically derived from the FEM.  Latches were modeled using a bushing element at 
the roller contact region.  Stiffness’s for latches were derived through separate testing.  Finally, the 
structure was modeled using FEM derived enforced displacements at each latch location.  The FEM 
structural displacements has not been correlated to test data.  However, using the this model setup and 
displacement inputs, the MSC.ADAMS model did indicate latch movement indicative of the latch 
movement that resulted in the proof pressure test anomaly as well as the instrumentation in the 
subsequent testing.  The take-away was the indication of latch movement away from the hard stops 
when an internal pressure load was applied.  Quantification of the latch movement is still being 
improved upon through increased modeling complexity and additional testing to correlate analysis 
predictions.  One single major improvement to the model will be the incorporation of a fully flexible 
hatch structure and elimination of the enforced displacements with the dependence on a separate 
analysis for input. 
Results 
Ultimately the proof pressure test failure of the Orion CMSH was due to the following factors: 
1. Excessive structural deflection 
2. Gearbox latch restraint not engaged 
3. Latch train motion not indicative of true over-center mechanism 
The excessive CMSH structural deflections, although well understood on their own, were not well 
understood as a system.  The structural deflections led to undesirable latch train movement.  The hatch 
structure was well within its structural margins but the stiffness of the hatch was insufficient to prevent 
inducing mechanism movement in the CMSH latch drivetrain.   
The gearbox latch restraint not being engaged was an unplanned event, though it’s results led to 
realizing an unknown potential failure.  This will in turn lead to a more robust design.  The CMSH latch 
assembly is designed to be fault tolerant.  In order to test each leg of the fault tolerance, they must be 
tested individually for full insight.  This lack of restraint engagement gave us that insight.  Testing with it 
engaged would have only masked the potential problem. 
The insufficient hatch structural stiffness led to undesirable motion that was large enough to move all 17 
latches toward their respective toggle points, with some going past their toggle points.  The latch design 
is an over-center mechanism that did not behave as a true over-center mechanism where when an 
external load is applied to the mechanism, it would continue toward a safe position.  In this case, the 
latch mechanisms were moving in the wrong direction for safe operation of the CMSH. 
The test results and supporting analysis show how important it is to test every possible configuration to 
verify that the fault tolerance in a mechanism is working as intended.  It also shows the importance of 
fully understanding the differences in how heritage flight hardware is used in a new environment. 
The lessons learned during the investigation were as follows: 
1. When using a heritage design, validate any assumptions made that change from a known 
successful hardware configuration. These changes will have an impact on hardware 
performance. 
2. Often over-center mechanisms are considered fool-proof under static loading conditions.  This 
anomaly provides an example of how mounting stiffness can defeat the over-center nature of a 
latch. 
3. When testing, instrument the article so that in the unfortunate event of a test failure, the effort 
can “fail smart”.  This test was assumed to be a simple check and the original instrumentation 
did not provide nearly enough insight to be able to understand what happened. 
4. Make sure critical configurations are verifiable.  The latch restraint that did not fully engage 
could not be seen without difficult borescope inspections. 
5. A kinematic model with structural flexibility is needed to fully verify adequate over-center 
linkage performance. 
 
